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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
Why has China produced higher growth rates than any other transition economy or let’s say 
India, and this despite the lack of a coherent reform plan?  
 
In general, ever since Coase (1937) and North (1989, 1990) it is assumed that property rights 
regimes can explain differences in economic performance of economies (or firms) with otherwise 
compatible resource endowments. According to this view, ill-defined property rights and weak 
enforcement can explain inefficient allocation of resources in a systematic way (Williamson 
1975, 1986, 1996; Barzel 1989; De Alessi 1980; Furubotn and Richter 1997). Subsequently 
when socialism collapsed there seemed to be a solution at hand. All that was needed for a 
successful transition to a market economy was to get private property rights established and 
enforced while allowing the price mechanism to allocate resources (Sachs and Woo 1997; 
Shleifer 1998; Shleifer and Vishny1994, Bull and Ingham 1998). Competition would force 
economic agents to search for efficient solutions, Competition would also stimulate the 
generation of intermediate institutions (so-called hybrids) that facilitate direct exchange in the 
presence of high transaction costs.  Hindsight showed how difficult it is to transplant an 
efficiently working property rights regime into another society. For the establishment of property 
rights and the generation of market conforming institutions, the cultural and institutional setting 
of a society obviously plays a big role. 
 
The case of China is instructive, as here an outright change of the property rights regime was 
not part of its reform policy. Nevertheless, China easily outperformed most, if not all, European 
transition economies that had followed economic advice and started their reforms by introducing 
private property rights and by liberalizing markets. Consequently, a literature appeared which 
implicitly if not explicitly argues that Chinese culture offers competitive advantages that 
compensate for the institutional disadvantage implied in the lack of a property rights regime 
(Wank 1996; Xin/Pearce 1996; Rozman 2002; Redding 1996b; Park/Luo 2001; King 1985; 
Hofstede 2001; Hamilton/Biggart 1988; Hamilton 1996; Boisot/Child 1996, 1998; Bian 1997). In 
the most general term, these cultural advantages can be summarised under generic social 
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capital and have led to the claim that there was an East Asian development model (Unger and 
Chan 1995). Generic social capital refers to a traditional predisposition toward relying on social 
relations that in China was not even interrupted during the planned economy period.  A short 
summary of the views on this kind of social capital, usually referred to as guanxi, would looks as 
follows: 
 
(1) Chinese economic agents tend to search for collectivist ways to solve problems. They 
habitually form networks as loose social institutions that facilitate contact and co-
operation (Yeung and Tung 1996) and define sanctions for transgression in behaviour. 
Thus, private firms and networks co-evolve. 
(2) By doing so Chinese entrepreneurs rely on long-term social concepts like reciprocity, 
trust, honour, and reputation (Davies et al. 1995; Luo and Chen 1996; Park and Luo 
2001) in order to reduce risk and secure stricter business control (Kiong and Kee 1998). 
Thus, the governance in and around firms will follow social norms. 
(3) Social norms, moral obligations pre-empt opportunistic behaviour. For enforcing co-
operation or business agreements, Chinese economic agents primarily look for bilateral 
solutions in form of re-negotiation or make use of trusted third persons. External 
institutions, such as courts or “markets”(e.g. Bond et al. 1992; Trubisky et al. 1991; 
Kirkbride et al. 1991) are rarely used. Moreover, the “face-maintenance” hypothesis (e.g. 
Ting-Toomey and Kurogi 1998) argues that legal action can make both parties 
blameworthy (Xu 1994) because they loose face for disturbing social harmony. Harmony 
is preserved when economic agents generate  “contractual security” through informal 
institutions such as trust or reputation.  
 
Any attempt to endogenise social capital means would involve so many different aspects that no 
clear theoretical explanation for a superiority in Chinese economic performance would emerge. 
Theory-building in this case requires identifying each of these aspects, such as networks, trust, 
reciprocity, face etc. by a quantifiable dimension which can be tested in form of systematic 
correlations between dimensions and, finally, economic performance. This paper explores what 
dimensions for explaining economic performance can be singled out in addition to and beyond 
the property rights regime. Next, it explores if these dimensions can be operationalised (or 
quantified) and what parameters could be used in different economies in order to produce 
statistical evidence needed for theory building.   
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The starting point of the research is the (empirical) truism that the move from a socialist to a 
market economy depends on the emergence of entrepreneurs. In a private economy, 
entrepreneurs as economic agents find the institutions that enable them to turn innovations into 
new products or production techniques in return for becoming residual claimants of profit. How 
to mobilize entrepreneurship is a general research question for transition economies. In China, 
social relations are a contributing factor to institutional change and play a part in the 
mobilisations of entrepreneurship. However, economic reforms bring with them an initial break-
up and transformation of social relations. Social structures that were formed under the planned 
economy need to be adapted in order to open the way for a market-based rationality and 
economic calculus to enter social relations. As a result, in the transition process new social 
relations emerge in response to new business opportunities. These new social relations 
ultimately need to conform to the market; they develop dynamically by utilising and at the same 
time discarding existing social structures. 
 
To explain this development constitutes a challenge for transaction cost economics, evolutionary 
economics, New Institutional Economics, but also for the management science literature. Rather 
than using concepts developed for any of these theories and searching for empirical support, the 
research design used here followed a different path by turning to the entrepreneurs of the ever-
growing number of new, i.e. non-state firms. These private entrepreneurs are the economic 
agents on whose perception, choice, or decisions China’s economic performance ultimately 
depends. No claim is made that they “know” the reasons behind the overall performance of 
China’s private sector, let alone understand the underlying systematic factors. What counts is 
which factors they regard as crucial for establishing private firms and for building up long-term 
business relations. This is the first step in singling out institutions or cultural components that 
might have contributed to the overall performance. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows. Next, a short summary of previous studies on firms interacting 
as core economic organisations with their external economic and institutional environment (Sec. 
2). The research design will be described in Sec. 3. A general description of the fieldwork and 
methods used follows in Sec. 4. Results will be presented in Sec. 5 around two main 
entrepreneurial activities, namely “How to establish a firm in an environment of high process-
uncertainty and missing private property rights” and “How to establish long-term business 
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activities in an environment of missing contractual safety?”. Each part ends with a discussion of 
the empirical results in reference to the two dominant streams of literature on China’s economic 
performance. The paper concludes with some general remarks and desiderata for further 
research that could contribute to theory building.  
 
 
PREVIOUS STUDIES 
  
Overall, TCE finds it hard to transfer its insights to transition economies. The reason is that all 
different organisational forms or governance structures identified by TCE represent transaction 
specific responses within market environments, i.e. under voluntary exchange, private property 
rights and functioning price mechanism (Menard 2002). 
 
However, TCE arguments are used in empirical studies to explain the emergence and 
functioning of firms and other intermediate governance institutions in China. These studies offer 
descriptive analysis based on field research in different locations and sectors and provide first 
insights into business practices in China. They agree that Chinese firms act efficiently when they 
search for modes of governance that reduce transaction costs. Transaction costs identified in 
these empirical studies are predominantly generated by administrative and political interference. 
However, the radical neoclassical view that China’s private sector would be better off if the state 
withdrew from the economic sector is hardly ever put forward in empirical studies. Instead, the 
challenge seems to lie in explaining why China’s economy is performing so well despite the lack 
of private property rights. As opposed to the “grabbing hand” (of the state) hypothesis (Shleifer 
and Vishny 1998), the alternative “helping hand” hypothesis draws attention to the supportive, 
transaction costs reducing role of the state as 
 
1) fiscal decentralisation and jurisdictional competition were introduced (Wong 1992; Krug 
2002), 
2) local authorities offered access to non-tradable input such as material, land, loans and 
information, and  
3) local authorities as regulators guaranteed property rights and contractual security (Walder 
1995, Che and Qian 1998, Krug and Hendrischke 2003, Rozelle and Li 1998). 
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Research from a political economy angle shows that the transition process depends less and 
less on formal positions in the nomenclatura or the influence of political agents but on the 
discretionary power of local administrations to allocate resources and re-allocate entitlements 
and (ownership) rights (Guthrie 1999) within firms (Opper et.al.2002) and within markets (Nee 
1992; Nee and Peng 1994). Nevertheless, there is a ‘persistence’ of old institutions and state 
bureaucracies which can be shown to benefit from the weak institutional frame of the reforms 
and the co-existence of the state sector and a nascent market sector by exploiting rent-seeking 
opportunities (Oi 1989; Shirk 1989; Stark 1990; Yang 2002).  But even without market forces 
prevailing, there is agreement on the ‘phasing-out’ hypothesis” which claims that the 
discretionary power of the state bureaucracy is diminishing over time. The ‘phasing-out’ 
hypothesis rests on  
 
1) fiscal decentralisation and  jurisdictional competition which considerably limit the resources 
under state control (Wong 1992; Krug 2002; Montinola, Y.Y. Qian and B.R. Weingast 1995; 
Qian and  Weingast 1997), 
2) ownership diversification and experiments with different modes of governance combined with 
the need to make best use of resources under gradually strengthening property rights (Cao 
and Nee 1998; Qian 2000). This will lead to 
3) a better performance of the new private sector which offers income and wealth creating 
opportunities outside the state sector (Nee 1992; Krug and Polos 2004). The resulting 
selection process attracts the more entrepreneurially minded (or better educated) economic 
agents to the private sector.  
 
The state bureaucracy will be left with the power to redistribute rather than directly controlling 
resources (Nee 1989; 1992; Pearson 1997). Many of these studies rely on interviews with state 
firms and official statistics as illustrative evidence for explaining the changes in the organisation 
of firms, their interaction with the nascent markets and political authorities, or changes in 
transaction costs.  
 
Approaches from social sciences which do not use transaction cost argument concentrate on 
the political and social consequences of the reforms. Political science approaches use the 
concept of local state corporatism to contextualise and downplay the importance of property 
rights as a crucial factor for explaining China’s economic development (Unger and Chan 1995). 
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They point to the fact that China’s first wave of economic growth was produced by (local) state 
controlled firms, when township and village enterprises (TVEs) in the mid-nineties accounted for 
half of China’s industrial output value and nearly half of China’s exports (SSYB 1997). The ‘local 
state corporatism hypothesis’ argues that local state institutions maintain a crucial role in local 
economies when they use their discretionary power to set up “patronage” or “clientelist” systems 
in support of local enterprises (Oi 1995, see also Wank 1999; Walder 1995). This way, local 
governments increase their revenues from a stable tax base and utilise them to exploit the new 
market chances (Wong 1992, Oi 1992). Instead of retreating from economic decision making, 
local governments have a strong incentive to expand economic interference in firms under their 
jurisdiction. This is a trend that runs counter the ‘phasing out’ of state interference.  These 
studies contribute important insights in the role of state-firm networks and the diversity of local 
situations. 
 
Guanxi and “entry modes” for multinationals (not to be discussed here) are the main focus of 
management science literature. This literature tends to use guanxi as an exogenous factor to 
explain Chinese business behavior and comparative advantages (Davies et.al. 1995: Kiong and 
Kee 1998; Park and Luo 2001; Xin and Pearce 1996).  Guanxi are seen at work in overcoming 
resource constraints, such as the lack of managerial talent (Carney 1998; Bruton et.al. 2000),  
generating legitimacy for private firms (Ahlstrom and Bruton 2001; Redding 1996) or ensuring 
favourable taxation and administrative facilitation (Peng 2000).  The case study approach with 
its wide-ranging generalisation is predominant in this argumentation. The drawback is that 
without operationalisation the contribution of guanxi to firm performance cannot be measured. 
Many authors are aware that the broad essentialist concept of guanxi forestalls analysis of 
differences in business behaviour and functioning of markets in China.  
 
Another stream of literature addresses the wide diversity in economic performance and 
ownership relations among all forms of private enterprises or enterprises in transition, including  
TVEs (first in Byrd and Lin 1990:3-18, see also Putterman 1993; Oi and Walder 1999; Whiting 
2001; Hsu 1999). Such diversity cannot be explained by referring to national legislation or 
theoretical positions in the approaches introduced above. These studies show that economic 
transition depends on more that the direction and speed by which socialist institutions get 
dismantled. Institutions matter, as do the local conditions under which new institutions replace 
old ones. Management science literature and socical psychology offer the notion of guanxi as 
  Page 8  
one, if not the single most crucial factor, for explaining the emergence of new institutions and 
organisational forms of firms in China. They draw heavily on the anthropological studies which 
sometimes contribute a non-economic perspective to the discussion (and confusion). These 
studies aim at clarifying the notion of guanxi, as meaning social relations built on “pre-existing 
relationships of classmates, people from the same native-place, relatives, superior or 
subordinate in the same workplace and so forth.” (Yang 1988: 411), or when they clarify other 
components governing such relationships, such as trust, “face” or moral obligations (Smart 
1993). Guanxi is often described as a core element of Chinese economic behaviour (Bian 2001; 
Wank 1996), even though the social aspect might dominate when guanxi is said to  
“acknowledge[s] the legitimacy both of seeking the accomplishment of instrumental aims 
through friends and of building relationships through mutual support and exchange, so long ass 
the instrumental use is subordinate to the cultivation of the relationship.” (Smart 1993: 404;). 
This view insinuates a dichotomy between market behavior based on an economic calculus and 
Chinese behavior based on a value attached to social relations. This dichotomy was one of the 
starting points for research summarised here and forms an important part of its agenda. 
Whether Chinese business behavior employs the economic calculus within the boundaries set 
by guanxi, or whether it acknowledges pre-existing ties within the boundaries defined by 
economic reasoning is an empirical question that as is the case with all forms of social capital 
cannot be solved without knowledge about the cultural/institutional frame of an economy  (Sobel 
2003; Wank 1999). 
 
In summary, this study takes up the threads from transaction cost, institutional and social 
debates and aims to contribute new insights to explain the diversity in property rights, institutions 
and social structures to research on transition economies with a view to establish institutional 
regularities in the transition process. 
 
 
THE RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
In transition economics the assumption of exogenously given institution is precarious. Rather, 
the question is: “How do institutions emerge, do the right institutions/organisations emerge, and 
what does it mean when one speaks about the ‘right’ institutions?” To start with the last question 
first. Institutions can generally be assessed by transaction cost criteria, but not so in transition 
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economies, where transaction costs provide a necessary but not a sufficient condition. In 
transition economies, institutions not only need to reduce transaction costs, they also need to 
conform to the rationale and discipline of nascent markets and competition. Entrepreneurs in 
transition economies face related problems. Entrepreneurship is not confined to the 
technicalities of setting up a firm that efficiently co-ordinates resources. Entrepreneurial activity 
plays a part in the building of institutions that will more and more facilitate voluntary exchange 
and the use of the price mechanism. 
 
The research applies a broad definition of institutions and attributes the emergence of 
institutions to three elements: the players, the rules of the game, and the strategies of the 
players within the game (Nelson 1994; North 1994; Aoki 2000, 2001). 
 Players: Taking into account what we know about guanxi, it is crucial to find out how 
economic agents use or create social relations when having to choose their business 
partners in a nascent market environment. ‘Persistency’ of old (bureaucratic) links is 
addressed in questions that investigate the choice of politically and administratively defined 
business partners. In contrast, new social relations emerge in response to questions 
addressing non-political and market related criteria. These links seem to be more stratified 
and to connect people horizontally. The extent to which family members, friends, the village, 
or class mates is questioned here to account for the standard guanxi. Beyond that, special 
emphasis is put on catching any business links that lie outside the standard guanxi. It is 
assumed that “embedding” a firm in social relations is a major entrepreneurial activity in all 
transition economies that in the end helps define shareholders as well as stakeholders of any 
firm or investment.  
 
 Rules of the game: Once economic agents have dismantled bureaucratic procedures in a 
transition economy, they need to invent new rules on how to conduct business transactions. 
In other words, they have to create new and effective modes of governance. The binding 
force of modes of governance either depends on the silent consent of players who take them 
for granted as custom-based forms of governance. Alternatively, new modes of governance 
need to be “architectured” through bargaining and codification. Again incorporating the 
literature on guanxi, the research distinguishes between relational governance and 
contractual governance. Relational governance refers to business relations built on trust, 
moral obligations, and reciprocity. Contractual governance refers to business relations built 
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on (written or unwritten) contracts, employing market discipline (exit) or recourse to law as 
enforcement mechanism. Specific questions focus on each of these modes.   
 
 Strategic response of entrepreneurs: The research design assumes that entrepreneurs will 
react systematically (or strategically) to procedural uncertainty in their external environment. 
Procedural uncertainty can be caused, for example, by the newness of the private business 
sector, by a weak institutional framework at national and local level, and by changes in 
national or local policies during transition. Entrepreneurs choose organisational 
arrangements to help them cope with the special transaction costs created by procedural 
uncertainty. In China, the diversity of organisational forms of firms and in institutional 
arrangements around business relations illustrates the degree of procedural uncertainty. This 
makes organisational choice the third major category of questioning. Organisational choice is 
examined by asking which factors and motives influenced the selection of specific 
organisational forms and what caused the switch from one to another organisational form. In 
light of the literature on guanxi, the empirical study did not confine its questions to transaction 
costs alone. Beyond asking for the motives for entrepreneurship or investment in business 
relations, respondents were also invited to list additional social or political motives for 
creating organisational links and structures. For example, the study queries the widespread 
assumption that Chinese entrepreneurs have a tendency to build up a family businesses.  
 
This research examines how entrepreneurs choose the “right” organisational form for a firm, 
select the “right” social relations for embedding business activities, and create an adequate form 
of governance in order to minimise transaction costs. We observe to what extent their choice 
depends on location and the interplay between the entrepreneurs and the political leadership on 
whose support the existence and success of private business dealings may depend. Two 
situations were singled out as essential for the development of private business from an 
entrepreneur’s perspective. One is the establishment of a firm which involves pooling, 
exchanging and remunerating resources in an uncertain institutional environment. The other is 
the management of a firm or, more precisely, the establishment of long-term business relations 
with customers and suppliers and possible other partners.  
 
 
THE EMPIRICAL STUDY 
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Methods 
 
Over a hundred interviews were conducted with Chinese entrepreneurs between 1999 and 
2003. The data were collected in three Chinese provinces, Zhejiang [2001, 2002, 2003], Jiangsu 
[2001, 2002, 2003], and Shanxi [1999]. Only those firms were included in the sample that were 
non-state and appeared relatively “free” to establish firms and choose business partners 
according to their ideas about business relations and guanxi. In the end the final sample 
consisted of eighty-one private firms that met the requirements of autonomy and a hard budget 
constraint.  
 
Similar to other studies on business and entrepreneurship development (e.g., Fillis, 2002), we 
used a twofold approach, namely a combination of in-depth interviews and standardized 
questionnaires. The interviews made use of two different sets of data. First, the life history and 
the governance structure of the respondent's firm was collected by means of open questions. 
Second, a questionnaire consisting of closed questions was used to further investigate the 
governance structure and configuration around firms. Selection criteria were applied to ensure 
that urban as well as rural firms, and not only firms working in traditional sectors but also firms 
working in modern sectors were included (Table 1). Firms were stratified by size, location and 
business sector. Despite these efforts the sample selection is biased to the extent that the 
respondents' firms were selected with the help of local institutions, such as academic network, 
banks, corporate networks, and local tax offices. Moreover, the observed tendency of Chinese 
firms to change sectors limits the usefulness of statistics on sectoral distribution as these cannot 
offer more than a snap shot.   
____________________________________________________________________________ 
Insert Table 1 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
A word on the representativeness of the sample: Chinese provincial statistics offer a poor basis 
for checking how representative the sample is. As Table 1 shows the categories are too broad 
for analytical purposes, as they still reflect administrative responsibilities of the former ministries 
rather than different output, production techniques, or industries. The sample does not attempt 
to present a systematic comparison across provinces. Provincial data use different calculation 
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methods and changing definitions for private enterprises. The diversity at the (in particular) local 
institutional level and the heterogeneity in Chinese culture challenge the usefulness of 
constructing indicators that claim to represent an overall picture. Modern management literature 
argues that “modes of rationality are built out of locally available conceptions” that are derived 
from “local practice/custom shaped by culture or institutions” (Clegg 1990, 158). Constructing  
representativeness at an aggregate level comes at the price of disregarding information which 
might be crucial for explaining specific features of local entrepreneurship and diversity. For these 
reasons the following refrains from presenting results a numerical form, a technique that would 
suggest a generalization far beyond what the quality and quantity of the data permit. 
 
Instead, we decided to choose a qualitative approach as our study is mainly exploratory, that is, 
we had no preconceived expectations on what the organisational and governance structures of 
the Chinese firms as well as the configurations around them would look like. As a consequence, 
no sophisticated scales to measure the different structures and/or configurations were included 
in our questionnaire, which would be a prerequisite for inference statistical data analysis. Instead 
we chose to offer the respondents a large number of different alternative responses to cover a 
wide range of different possibilities. 
 
As the participants of the study preferred the interviews not to be taped, notes were taken during 
the interviews and transcribed shortly afterwards. Interviews were conducted directly in Chinese 
without relying on interpreters. The questionnaires were bi-lingual with the Chinese language 
version used for the interviews. All empirical research took place in close collaboration with 
Chinese partner institutions, which aside from assisting in the conceptualisation of the study 
helped selecting and finding interview partners.  
 
Sample 
 
The following gives a short overview over the data set. 
 
1. Function of respondents.The respondents typically had a central position in the company: 
Fifty-six per cent of the managers were CEOs [directors, general managers], about fifteen per 
cent described themselves as owner/managers. The managers are young, the average age of 
the respondents were forty with the youngest being 28 and the oldest being sixty-one years of 
age.  
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2. Geographical distribution. The interviews took place in three provinces. The data collected in 
Shanxi [1999] provide almost fifteen per cent of the total data, the data collected in Jiangsu and 
Zhejiang [2000, 2001 and 2003) provided twenty seven per cent and fifty eight per cent 
respectively. 
 
3. Sectoral distribution:  
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
Insert Table 2 
 
 
4. Size. As a rule new firms are small. Forty per cent employ a workforce of forty or less 
employees; one third have a workforce between forty and two hundred employees, while 
somewhat surprisingly over one quart [28,4 %] per cent had a workforce of over 200. 
 
 5. Turnover. The small to medium size of enterprises is also reflected in the figures for annual 
turnover. Almost one quarter [23.5%] record a turnover of ten million or less RMB (1.2 mil US-$), 
thirty per cent a turn over between ten and one hundred million RMB (1.2 to 6 mil US-$), almost 
the same percentage [28.4%] a turnover between one hundred and five hundred mil RMB (12 to 
60 mil US-$), while nine per cent reported a turnover of five hundred million or more. That ten 
per cent of the respondents did not want to reveal their turnover did not come as a surprise. 
 
6. Age of the firms. Adjusted for the year of the interview the data show that half of the firms 
were established in the eighties, forty per cent in the nineties, and ten percent existed earlier. 
These answers should not be taken at face value. In particular when firms „grew out“ of the old 
village economy, respondents found it difficult to name a date that marked the end of a socialist 
firm and the beginning of a new TVE. Moreover, those respondents who claim that the firm was 
established before the eighties when no private firms existed obviously fail to see the difference 
between a socialist firm and the type of firms they manage at the moment.  
 
In what follows no attempt is made to analyse the data with respect to these socio-demographic 
data. The reason for doing so are empirical and conceptual. It transpired during the fieldwork 
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only how much problems respondents had in naming the date when the firm in its present form 
was established, or naming core activities. Any attempt to ascribe certain features to one firm 
implies more arbitrariness than can be justified in an analysis that aims at including dynamic 
elements. In short, the description of the sample offers a point of reference with no claim that the 
situation is the same by the time the results are published. 
 
 
HOW TO ESTABLISH A FIRM? 
 
The external environment 
 
One legacy of the past are missing or „fuzzy“ property rights, lack of capital in private hands, and 
the [still] high share of assets and input under state control. The first hurdle for entrepreneurs 
are the technical aspects of establishing a firm, namely buying assets and machinery or leasing 
buildings, including borrowing money. As in all transition economies, assets [including money 
and the licence to produce or export] need to be pooled by involving those in control of these 
scarce assets to join the „founding father“ in some form of partnership or transfer the right to use 
assets in return for money or various form of  favours. 
 
Another legacy of the past is uncertainty meaning that [Krug/Polos 2004] 
1. entrepreneurs faces a low general level of business expertise in the society at large. There is 
no one to be imitated and no established procedure to follow. Expertise cannot easily be 
acquired, neither with the help of formal or informal education nor can it be bought. In short, 
the newness of an activity and its organizational form pose challenges for entrepreneurs. 
2. there is no collective memory about what can go wrong, as there is no past experience or 
routine upon which economic agents can rely.  
3. there is no general knowledge about (excess) demand, price- or income elasticity of demand, 
let alone systematic research that would help an entrepreneur to calculate the market risk.  
4.  
The organisational forms of firms can be expected to reflect these shortcomings of the business 
environment. 
 
Who owns the resources? 
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Typically firms are owned by some form of collective and not by one individual. Yet, to conclude 
from this result that the inherited structures prevail would be misleading as the following figures 
show. Only 18.5 per cent of the interviewed firms admitted that a state firm of other stage 
agency, such as the village, are the ultimate owners. One quarter of firms are owned by a family 
[10 %] or by a group of [less than six] friends [15 %]. Family ties or shared sentimental ties and 
norms are the background from which these entrepreneurs will start their business. In these 
cases that rely on traditional guanxi we can expect that relational governance will be used for 
allocation resources, co-ordinating activities and remunerating input. Another quarter of firms 
were established by groups of investors, i.e. economic agents that provided [monetary] loans in 
return for interest, but were not involved in the management of the firm. This is a different from 
the above form of guanxi, more akin to networks, where economic actors with complementary 
economic interests, in this case those in need of financial means and those who search for 
investment opportunities, agree on “collective action”. They employ contractual governance 
when using written or unwritten contracts that stipulate interest rate and/or length of contract. 
Another large part (26%) were Schumpeterian entrepreneurs relying on loans from friends of 
family members which came with harsh conditions and not as gifts. The overall picture is that the 
majority of firms started off  embedded in various forms of guanxi.  However, we observe that 
these guanxi can be market conform, provided hard constraints and use elements of contractual 
governance.  
 
The diversity of ways in which firms are embedded in old structures, in private social relations 
and in networks based on common economic interest, is also confirmed when one looks at the 
sources from which firms acquired their assets. Nearly half of the respondents report to have 
been the recipients of funds from local governments, twenty per cent name family loans, thirty-
six per cent report funds received from private investors and forty per cent from banks.  
 
It is worth emphasizing that bank loans became available only since the middle of the nineties 
while before entrepreneurs had to rely on funding or loans from local government, friends or the 
family. Yet, this does not change the overall picture that new firms when it comes to acquiring 
the initial endowment of a firm rely on old social relations inherited from the past or new social 
relations with a clear economic rationale. The generally assumed predisposition for social 
relations based on family or friendship ties was less important than the literature suggests. 
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The fuzziness of property rights can only partly be explained by the lack of national legislation. 
Often enough fuzziness reflects strategic manoeuvring of firms in an environment of uncertainty. 
As the open question in the interviews revealed, that fact that more than half of the firm officially 
state that they distribute profit according to shares needs to be taken with a grain of salt. Most 
firms do not pay any dividend, but re-invest all net profit.  This does however not mean that the 
“owners” of assets remain unremunerated. Instead of dividends they can claim part of the cash 
flow of a firm when they ask the firms to take over part of their personal expenses [travelling, 
cars, banquets]. With no record who owns what, it is reasonable to surmise hat all those who 
succeed in claiming part of the cash flow of a firm are stakeholders, entitled to remuneration. 
Unsurprisingly, there is no formal “corporate governance” [see also Vishny andXXX] to regulate 
this status. In the absence of boardroom meetings that would indicate contractual, market 
conforming governance, or “orders” from state agencies that would indicate the still working old 
governance structure, the decision making between “owners” or better, stakeholders, in firms is 
characterised by constant negotiations in which the expectations of the different stakeholders 
get reconciled.  To put it succinctly, the interests of stakeholders and more recently shareholders 
in the new firms are co-ordinated and streamlined through relational governance rather than 
contractual governance. 
 
Physical assets 
 
Lack of infrastructure was not seen as a major hindrance for entrepreneurship. Nearly 90% of 
the respondents regarded the road/rail/air transport infrastructure as important and adequate, 
the same was reported for communication, such as telephone, fax, internet, or email. Three forth 
of the respondents regards the availability of supporting financial services (e.g. banks) as 
important and sufficient. Likewise, the same percentage  regarded the availability of land of as 
important and also adequately available. This might reflect a systematic bias. Those companies 
that were interviewed were those who obviously knew how to overcome the resource constraint 
inherited from the past. Another factor contributing to this favourable picture could be that the 
well-developed regions in Jiangsu and Zhejiang dominate the sample. Yet, as further talks 
confirm infrastructure seemed to be no longer a major hindrance for entrepreneurship. The 
picture changes, however, when it comes to human and social capital. 
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Human capital 
 
Human capital is seen as the most crucial factor in the initial endowment of firms. Unskilled 
labour is dismissed with only twenty per cent regarding it as important and the majority insisting 
that it is adequately available. This is no surprise in a country characterised by un- and 
underemployment. On the other hand ninety per cent of the respondents think skilled labour as 
important with half agreeing that not enough skilled labour is available.  
 
This result points to a feature in Chinese entrepreneurship which only recently caught the 
attention of the outside world. Many Chinese entrepreneurs are not content with producing low 
price-low quality goods for which unskilled or semi-skilled labour would suffice. Instead they 
invest in new technology that demand a higher share of educated employees. As the open 
questions confirmed, a great many entrepreneurs want to become integrated in international 
production chains.  
 
Nothing illustrates the importance of human capital better than the fact that virtually all 
respondents insist that managerial skill is the most crucial success factor for the firm. Yet only 
half of the respondents agreed that managerial talent is adequately available. The scarcity of 
managerial talent can explain the great number of firms that got privatised by management buy 
outs (MBOs). Successful managers converted part of the performance-related salary into 
shares. A clearer picture of this trend will be available only after the incorporation of firms in 
China will offer more comprehensive records. Yet as the open interviews and other empirical 
studies show, firms in which the former manager turned into the owner [or at least acquired a 
substantial percentage of total shares] seem to dominate the new private sector. An example will 
be given in the case study below. The life histories of the firms confirm that the minor role of the 
family in the emergence of a private sector is caused by lack of private savings within families, 
but equally, if not more, by the lack of managerial talent for families to draw on. This was one of 
the reasons for potential entrepreneurs looking for alternatives when they established a firm 
[Hendrischke 2004].  
 
All in all, regardless whether managers were appointed by political authorities on the basis of 
inherited structures of social relations, or appointed through connections with those in control 
over scarce resources on the basis of friendship ties, all managers faced strong incentives to 
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perform. In this aspect the establishment of firms followed economic reasoning and contractual 
governance best documented in the crop-sharing kind of contract by which managers were 
employed [Krug 2003].  
 
The following case illustrates the crucial importance of management skills and the way the track 
record of a successful manager is decisive in structuring an MBO and corporate activities linked 
to it. While the deal would not have been successful without personal relations, it is evident that 
the personal relations were spun around one specific individual with a view to secure his long-
term cooperation and commitment. The successful manager had in fact a choice between 
networks whose members were competing for the asset managed by him.   
 
Case [2003 Interview 010] 
A second generation MBO: Incorporating Managerial skill 
 
First generation MBOs were characterized either by pressure from below, when managers who 
had set up their enterprises claimed their property rights, or by policies from above, when local 
administrations were asked to devolve property rights in collective or small state-owned 
enterprises to managers and de facto, though not de jure, owners of enterprises.  Depending on 
the local political environment, these MBOs happened from the late 1980s to the end of the 
following decade. Second generation MBOs can be observed post-2000 in different localities. 
These second generation MBOs were pursued mainly by local government institutions under 
pressure to complete overall privatization in their jurisdiction. 
 
Whereas first generation MBOs gave considerable lee way and decision making power to local 
authorities in terms of fixation of asset prices, debt transfer, privatization schedules, share 
allocations to managers and labor regulations, second generation MBOs happened in a much 
more regulated and transparent environment. Local administrations were under much more 
pressure to publicly justify their actions and to avoid the impression of favors to and protection of 
special interests. Second generation MBOs in more advanced provinces also were now 
supported by banks and experienced financial investors able to back management in their 
negotiations. The change in procedures from first to second generation did not happen suddenly, 
but in stages that gradually increased public accountability and transparency.  
 
For example, in Suzhou, an internal Party document specified privatization procedures through 
2002 and until April 2003, public auction was made mandatory. Up to that date, local authorities 
had the option to proceed by ‘internal transformation (neibu gaizhi)’ or ‘Internal agreement (neibu 
xieyi)’, which allowed them to negotiate individual settlements with preferred clients. Since April 
2003, in this local instance, a reserve price for assets has to be established on the basis of an 
asset evaluation, and investors are invited to submit their bids. The ensuing auction has to be 
repeated at least once if the reserve price is not reached. Only in exceptional cases are local 
authorities allowed to deviate from this procedure. 
 
The MBO in which Mr. Niu was involved happened just before public auction became mandatory, 
but included already competitive bidding between different interested parties. Mr. Niu’s bid was 
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also no longer the traditional take-over of an asset, but a sophisticated operation in a highly 
dynamic environment. Mr. Niu is a self-made man who had to make his way up from the bottom of 
the hierarchy before he became general manager of a state-owned three star hotel in the Suzhou 
New Development Zone in 1997. By this time, he had acquired a university education in night 
classes and was on the way to get an MBA degree. The owner of the hotel, the Suzhou New 
Development Zone Management group also owned a four star hotel and three commercial 
companies. Mr. Liu managed to place this hotel into a market segment that gave him occupancy 
rates of 95 per cent and left him without serious competition.  
 
When his hotel came up for privatisation in 2002, Mr. Niu had witnessed one of the last cases of 
first generation MBO in his group. The general manager of the group-owned four star hotel was 
able to negotiate a deal with his management corporation that gave him a share of 35 per cent in 
a deal that was worth over one hundred million yuan. The money he needed was borrowed from a 
local bank that accepted the hotel, i.e. his future share in the hotel, as a security for the loan. 
Shortly after, these kind of deals were banned under banking regulations.  
 
For the privatisation of Mr. Niu’s hotel, the management corporation as the owner used ‘internal 
agreement’ procedures to find investors and finally came up with a list of five interested parties. 
All competing parties approached Mr. Niu and made him various offers, seeing that Mr. Niu was 
crucial to make the asset profitable. Mr. Niu eventually decided to throw in his lot with the only 
group of investors that offered him a share in the deal. Once Mr. Niu had reached agreement with 
the three investors, the deal with the management corporation was finalized within a week, as his 
group offered the best price. The three investors acquired shares of 38 per cent, 32 per cent and 
25 per cent respectively and helped Mr. Niu to acquire a share of 5 per cent out of the deal worth 
21.5 million yuan.  
 
Unlike many of the first generation MBOs, this deal did not secure Mr. Niu control over the asset, 
nor did it tie him to his position indefinitely. The contract he signed with his co-shareholders was 
limited to three years on his insistence. Mr. Niu had calculated his options very carefully. The 
period of three years was the medium term for which he could foresee that he would be able to 
maintain his competitive position in the local market. More importantly, he had decided not to 
push for a larger share, although he knew that his investors had granted a 10 per cent share to 
another general manager in a similar project elsewhere. What counted more for him was that the 
share he held jointly with them served as an entry into their business network and turned him from 
a manger into a shareholder. The three business partners, keen to keep Mr. Niu committed to 
their hotel enterprise, offered him shares in other investment projects and gradually expanded his 
role beyond his original position into a fourth shareholder in their real estate and agricultural 
businesses. What appeared like a management incentive share turned out to become a 
substantial form of co-ownership. It would allow Mr. Niu to withdraw from the hotel and 
concentrate on other activities should the grounds of the hotel at some stage be re-zoned for 
residential usage. This would increase the land value more than four fold and possibly make 
continued hotel operation an unprofitable option in the longer run. 
 
 
Organisational form. 
 
The questionnaire asked how firms registered and how often they changed their registration and 
organisational form. The resulting picture remained highly complex for the following reasons: 
First, In particular at the beginning of the reforms there was no organisational choice. Instead 
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young entrepreneurs or the local leadership waited for national or provincial guidelines. Second, 
as was shown elsewhere [Krug 2003], the organisational form as documented on in official 
documents or on business cards is a poor indicator for the actual form of firm. In the case of 
data on Shanxi collected between 1995-1999, the actual governance structure and the type of 
firm as printed on the business card matched only in fifty five per cent of the cases. Aside from 
ignorance, the registration often enough served the purpose to hide private ownership by, for 
example calling the firm a TVE. In general, the ownership regime and economic nature of each 
firm had to be “constructed” during the interviews. The formal criteria, such as legal form, type of 
registration, etc., did not provide sufficiently reliable information on the degree of autonomy the 
management of the firm enjoyed. Based on information about the founding history of the firm, it 
normally took several question to ascertain who was the claimant of residual income (profit). 
More comprehensive information would flow from questions about stakeholders entitled to part 
of the companies cash flow, entitlements  to using the firm’s facilities or accounts. Information of 
such detailed nature was not always forthcoming and required rounds of questions.  
 
 Finally, we noticed that by relying on quantitative data collected over different years one easily  
misses the dynamics of Chinese entrepreneurship. Case studies as the one above, harden the 
weak evidence that suggests itself in the quantitative data. A cautious interpretation of the life 
histories points to the following trends in organisational change [Hendrischke 2003]: The first 
stage of entrepreneurship led to the “localisation” of firms when local authorities were needed for 
both acquiring resources and protecting property rights. The form of a TVE offered an 
organisational form that could command the highest local protection [see also Yep, McNally]. 
With increasing business success accompanied by MBOs a mix between private and public 
“ownership”  became the dominant form of firms. This was facilitated by changes in legislation 
by which private persons and firms were acknowledged as rightful owners of capital assets. The 
implementation of the company law offered the possibility to incorporate companies either in 
form of limited liability companies or in form of corporations. In our sample, the first form 
dominates the private sector irrespective of whether the firm started as a collective firm inherited 
form the past or as a private or family business venture. In all cases the motive behind the 
incorporation seems to be the conversion of stakeholders into shareholders [see case study]. 
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Discusssion 
 
Relying on the quantitative data and life histories the following pattern emerges. Which type of 
new “private” companies were established depends first on the intention of the founding fathers. 
In the case of China this group is dominated by friends or local jurisdictions; and second the way 
resources were mobilised. The dominant feature is that mobilisation relied on offering collective 
property rights to all those in control of scarce resource and willing to contribute to the 
establishment of firms. In return monetary incentives were offered either in form of a share in 
residual profit, or (more frequently used) access to the firm’s cash flow.  Managerial talent, seen 
as the most crucial scarce resource was recruited on the basis of incentive contracts which 
beside performance-related salaries entitled managers to future ownership. Which type of new 
firms emerges depends further on the interaction between entrepreneurs, political authorities (as 
regulators) and intermediate institutions such as (political) connections, social networks such as 
friends, and increasingly more on market intermediaries such as banks. Finally, which type of 
firms emerges depends also on the social embeddednes of a firm. How to embed a firms 
followed some constitutive beliefs (Scott 1995) of the founding fathers, namely that 
 
 firms need to start with a strong local  rather than organizational identity. Virtually all 
interviewed firms started by searching for local resources, producing for local markets, 
inviting local stakeholders, and negotiating with local regulators. 
 firms benefit from accepting local political stakeholders, if not shareholders. Mixed ownership 
is seen as the “normal” way for establishing a firm. Aside from transaction cost 
considerations such as access to information, licences and property rights protection, the 
involvement of political stakeholder is seen as a way to attain legitimation as a new 
organization. 
 contractual governance and market operations needs to be embedded in relational 
governance that allows accommodating the demands of the inherited political structure and 
the social demands of the near environment. 
 
The last point will be taken up in what follows when it is asked how firms start and safeguard 
long term business relations. 
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HOW TO ESTABLISH BUSINESS RELATIONS 
 
 
External Environment 
The change from bureaucratic procedures for co-ordinating economic activities to voluntary 
exchange is at the core of the transition from a socialist to a market economy. In transition 
economies uncertainty and the newness of a private sector generate formidable thresholds for 
starting private production and exchange. In practical terms, private entrepreneurs may come 
under pressure to remain in well-tested networks with state officials, in particular when these use 
personal guanxi to further their private interest. These links might offer higher returns in the short 
run, but also impede them in forming and expanding new business with private partners (Yang 
2002).  
Where remnants of state monopolies and officials dominate factor and product markets, new 
firms without the possibility to choose between potential business partners inside and outside 
the state sector are severely hampered in their entrepreneurial activities. This is well 
documented in other transitions economies. As Greif [1993] has shown the selection of 
trustworthy business partners works as an effective ex ante device against such pressures. The 
availability of personal networks enables private entrepreneurs to employ social, as opposed to 
economic, institutions as collective agents for co-ordinating the sanctioning of opportunistic 
behaviour. In China the effect of the reforms on choosing social and business relations presents 
itself as follows. In the old (socialist) economic system formal positions in the nomenclatura and 
lower bureaucratic echelons were the only criteria that defined the pool of “business partners”, 
because they provided access to resources. The reforms enlarged this pool by including 
potential partners with independent access to resources, irrespective of political criteria. Thus, 
the pool includes all those whose technical competence, control over resources or products is 
economically valuable for establishing  long term business relations. Among the variety of 
potential business partners firms select those who in addition to their economic value offer social 
values, such as trust and reciprocity. The resulting hybrids come close to those identified by 
TCE for market economies, as the constraints set by the external environment is less decisive 
than the transaction-specific features in the business relation.   
The alternative view assumes that social relations and guanxi primarily define the pool of 
potential business partners and that economic activity is rent seeking and essentially structured 
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around the available partners, In this case entrepreneurs will screen the pool of trustworthy 
potential business partners for those who in addition to their social connectedness also offer 
economic resources or a commitment to developing resources, techniques, and products. 
Relational governance is required match the interests of business partners in order to ensure 
that, individually or jointly, they invest in the coordinated generation of knowledge or production 
of goods 
The difference between these two approaches is more than a matter of academic contest 
between TCE and those management studies approaches claiming a Chinese disposition 
towards social relations. The difference relates to substantial search costs and resulting 
institutional environment. In the first case firms will search for “hard” data, such as a firm’s 
capacity, resources base, finances, quality and price. For transition economies with their ill-
functioning markets, TCE expects intermediary institutions to emerge, such as banks, 
consultants or head-hunters able to facilitate the matching of supply and demand. In the second 
case resources will be spend on searching for the “right” person in terms of connections, 
trustworthiness, or moral obligations accumulated in the past. The evolving intermediary 
institutions are more socially oriented and facilitate the exchange of gifts and favours that assist 
in establishing long-term relations. (Young 1995) Frequent personal contact and exchange of 
information accompany the relational governance. It is worth stressing that in this case the 
match between the persons, firms, production techniques, supplier-customer relations defines 
the economic activity.  
Thus, embedding business relations in social relations does not imply the absence of any 
intermediate governance institution for enforcing business relations. The difference is that in 
social relations where norms of moral obligations and reciprocity dominate, we see the 
emergence of social intermediary institutions such as clubs, temples or restaurants emerge that 
facilitate contact, emotional bonding or moral obligations.  
In contrast, in a resource-based entrepreneurial environment, social institutions would establish 
linkages of incentives, governance, information and knowledge between different business 
partners. Such institutions can be Chambers of Commerce and Industry, contract laws and court 
ordering, but also statutes for corporate governance that set incentives to invest in long-term 
relations while restraining (ex post) opportunism.  
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On the issue of how entrepreneurs chose business partners, which selection criteria they 
applied and which mode of governance they used for enforcing business relations, respondents 
were asked to give details on one important and typical business relationship, generally a 
supplier or customer with whom the firm traded regularly. The emphasis was on long-term 
relations, as these are at the core of the development of a private sector. Spot market 
transactions, i.e. the notorious wheeling and dealing at the beginning of economic transition, 
were not taken into account. 
 
 
Choice 
More than half of the respondents report that their business arrangement values less then 10 
million RMB (1.2 mil US-$), another fifth values between 10 and 50 million RMB (1.2 to 6 mil US-
$) and again another fifth more then 100 million RMB (12 mil US-$). The business partners were 
typically chosen from more then two possible offers. Nearly half of the respondents had even 
more then five options. The business relations ran for up to two years for one third of the 
sample, for one third of the cases already between three and five years, for another third more 
then five years. Only one respondent started a business relation with a family member. Most 
business partners are located outside the province, only for ten per cent the partner was situated 
within a distance of five kilometres. 
  
 
 
Determinants of choice in business relations 
 
Personal recommendation (guanxi) 
Half of the respondents insists that personal recommendation are very important for choosing a 
business partner while three quarters agree that both respectability and influence within the local 
community are crucial factors in selecting a business partner. On the other hand, family 
connections were of almost importance, yet nearly half of the respondents had pre-existing 
personal or social contact with their business partner.  
Yet, business relations need to align with the economic interest involved: Price and quality of 
goods, reliability in delivering and a high technical standard were decisive arguments for nearly 
all entrepreneurs in our sample. More then half agreed that their partner was willing to invest 
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time and effort in the business relation, while to a slightly lesser extent it was agreed that the 
partner had invested also in capital equipments to specifically meet the firm’s needs. Access to 
capital through the business partner was regarded as equally important. Moreover, the partner’s 
access to business information, new customers, further business contacts in the province and 
(to a slightly lesser extent) in China or worldwide were also reported by half of the respondents. 
 
While access to networks and relational governance based on norms of reciprocity were 
important for half of the respondents, membership of those who could broker political influence 
at the local level was seen as important by one third of the respondents as opposed to fifteen 
per cent who tried to get access to member that could broker influence at the (central) state 
level.  
 
Resource constraint 
  
To see whether business relations were seen as a means to the scarcity or non-tradability of 
resources the respondents were asked to indicate agreement/disagreement  that they were 
chosen as supplier on the ground that the other firms lacked resources. Fifty per cent agreed 
that the customer lacked technical experience (thirty per cent disagreed), lacked physical space 
fifty per cent (39 %), financial resources twenty five per cent (69 %), spare capacity to meet 
fluctuations in demand twenty five per cent (54 %). These figures offer weak support only to the 
assumption that Chinese business relations are driven by the need to cope with the resource 
constraint. The picture does not look better in the complementary question, namely when 
respondents were asked to give reasons why they had chosen a specific supplier. Only thirty per 
cent agreed that lack of technical experience caused them to embark on a specific business 
relation while seventy per cent disagreed). The respective figures for lack of physical space was 
forty per cent (39 %), financial resources thirty per cent (50%), and spare capacity eighteen per 
cent (54%).  
 
Specialisation gain 
 
To  build up a core business or exploit cost advantages  was even less confirmed as the motive 
that prompted the firms for establishing business relations. Asked whether the respondents were 
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chosen as supplier as the customer faced higher production costs was answered to a affirmative 
by twenty nine per cent only, while fifty four disagreed. The answers to higher labour costs were 
thirty eight per cent (40%), lack of managerial time nineteen per cent (59%), while twenty five 
per cent agreed that they were chosen because otherwise the customer firm would have been 
distracted from their core business.  The complementary set of questions, namely why the 
respondents had chosen a supplier offer a similar picture. They had chosen a supplier because 
they faced higher production costs was agreed by twenty five per cent (70 %), higher labour 
costs twenty five per cent (45 %), lack of managerial time twenty three per cent (64 %), while 
however seventy per cent agreed that otherwise they would have been distracted from the core 
business. 
 
Thus on one side “hard economic data” such as quality, price, delivery  play a role in the 
establishment of business relations regardless how the business partner were selected on the 
ground of personnel recommendations and social contact. On the other side it is very hard argue 
in the light of these figures that long term business relations are established as a means  for 
overcoming the resource constraint or to appropriate specialisation advantages.  
 
Modes of governance 
 
If it is not the direct economic advantage out of special business relation than the mode of 
governance might play a role. Whether contractual or relational governance both mode offer 
incentives and enforcement mechanism for  harnessing business relations. One extreme would 
be relational governance generating incentives for foregoing opportunistic behavior because this 
is the way it was always done, and because mutual trust, frankness and assistance are seen as 
the “natural” basis for any business relationship, while the loss of reputation for being a 
trustworthy partner defines the default for misdemeanor. On the other hand, contractual 
governance asks for legislation, law enforcing agencies  and court ruling as the last resort for 
enforcing agreements. Whether these two scenarios juxtapose two different sets of incentives 
and sanctioning was the context of the last set of questions in which espondents were asked 
why they acknowledged agreements. 
 
The respondents clearly acknowledged the usefulness of contracts and contractual governance. 
Half of the respondents report that the threat of legal redress motivates them to abide 
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agreements. All, but a minor group does so in order to safeguard future business dealings with 
the business partner. For nearly all respondents prompt delivery and the two-way exchange of 
information is crucial to the success of such a relationship. Even though the willingness of a  
business partner to acknowledge extra-contractual requests is not crucial for the success of a 
relationship for half of the respondents,  it still is an important argument for forty per cent. All 
respondents insist that written agreements accompanying a business arrangement are legally 
binding. 
 
Yet, at the same time, the respondents also confirm the usefulness of social relations and 
relational governance. Almost all respondents abide by agreements, because they consider it as 
the conventional way things are done in business. They fear of loss of reputation on the 
personal level and for the firm. Almost all regard personal honour and the commitment to 
convention as another reason to acknowledge agreements, while half of the respondents see 
personal friendship (but not the family) as a major reason for honouring agreements. Mutual 
cooperation and mutual trust between the respondents firm and their business partner consider 
all respondents as crucial for the success of the firm. Most of the respondents trust their 
business partners, that they would not take unfair advantage of their firm should the opportunity 
arise. All respondents are also convinced, that their business partners trusts them to be reliable. 
Half of the respondents report that they exchange full and frank information about their business 
plans with their partners, whereas the other half is reluctant to do so. Personal contact in social 
settings is considered as important by three forth of the managers. Consistent with the other 
data, family connections with a wide range of people only plays a minor role for the success of 
the firm.   
 
Discussion 
 
 Overall, the results tend to confirm the prediction of transaction cost analysis that increasing 
market competition leads to a substitution of vertically structured political networks by 
horizontally structured networks between firms (Nee 1999). Firms choose business partners for 
reasons other than political expediency. If political agents are chosen as business partners, this 
happens because they can substitute market input rather than for social or political reasons.  
Yet, as the answers reveal, there are also limits to efficiency considerations when business 
relations are formed. Neither resource constraints nor specialization gains, both important 
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reasons for long-term links, are seen as most decisive in establishing business links by the 
majority of respondents. Instead, the importance of personal recommendation or reputation is 
emphasized to the degree that one has to conclude that efficiency consideration come into force 
as long as they can be embedded in some form of guanxi.  In other words, Chinese 
entrepreneurs and firms combine elements of contractual and relational governance to the 
degree that they become mutually dependent. A dichotomy between moral obligations and 
norms on one side and economic reasoning does not fund much support by the respondents. As 
much as this role of relational governance can constitute a strength and be a condition for 
survival in an institutionally weak environment, it would also have obvious drawbacks, as it limits 
the pool of expertise available to a firm to what can be integrated within the framework of 
relational governance.  
 
Interpretations for the smooth blending of different modes of governance could assume 
difference time horizons linked to transition stages or different operational areas in a firms 
activities. Some answers indicate that contractual governance dominates current operation 
which under increasing competition needs to search for the best use of resources, while 
relational governance dominates the exploration process for investment in future production, 
capabilities or organizational form in an environment where no risk-mitigating institutions exist. 
Here the advantage of relational governance to expand exploration beyond the confines of the 
firm and to exploit its embeddedness comes into play. This interpretation emerged during 
fieldwork when answers pointed to the need to inquire into visible and removed incentives that 
might have prompted entrepreneurs and managers to establish business relations.  
 
As life histories and informal talks revealed, in many cases it was not the immediate return for 
the firm, but acquiring ‘options’ on future business dealings in the actual or other lines of 
business, present or future, that prompted the establishment of business links, even for yet to be 
established firms. The case study offers an illustrative example for this kind of strategic 
behaviour. Related to this kind of ‘real option’ policy is the role of networks within the new 
business sector. Business relations open access to networks that can control underlying 
property rights and act as entrepreneurs behind the scenes. Their activities can be more crucial 
for the business partners than the survival of an individual firm. The establishment of business 
relations with one specific business partner can not necessarily be regaded in isolation or only 
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with reference to one specific firm, but may indicate expected returns from future lines of 
business. 
 
As long as systematic research is missing, the results allow only to point to new research areas, 
such as the linkage and interaction of firms and economic actors with networks and even 
interaction between networks. 
 
 
SUMMARY: WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE? 
 
The results do not allow refuting or supporting any of the theoretical prepositions employed so 
far in empirical studies. TCE-based analysis or the corporatist model, for example, are not 
“wrong” in the sense that the there is no causal link between the factors they have identified for 
the economic performance of China’s private sector. Rather, the results indicate that one crucial 
factor is missing, namely the economic working of social relations or guanxi. Yet, to claim as the 
management or anthropological literature does, that this factor is decisive is neither supported 
by the field study. None of the existing approaches can explain the diversity in property rights 
relations, organizational forms of firms, and the different combination of relational and 
contractual governance that the respondents refer to.  
 
A cautious interpretation of the empirical results show that China’s entrepreneurs share the 
following assumptions. First, to embed a firm within a locality (as opposed to an industry or 
factor market) is seen as the ‘natural” way of starting a firm. Second, to incorporate firms as 
legal persons while keeping local state agencies involved as (minority) stake- or shareholders is 
regarded as a given procedure to safeguard the operation, expansion and diversification of a 
firm. Third, using efficiency considerations for establishing business relations is not in conflict 
with guanxi norms, let alone with “Chinese culture”. Business relations are embedded in both 
relational and contractual modes of governance. These three forms of embeddedness (local 
society and administration, local ownership structure and modes of governance) can serve as a 
useful proxy for both the motifs of the “founding fathers” of firms or intermediary institutions, and 
the ‘taken-for-grantedness’ of inherited business routines.  
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Seen from this perspective the empirical findings suggest to include embeddedness as a factor 
explaining diversity (and performance) in and between transition economies. TCE attempts to 
explain diversity by different degrees of market penetration and different forms of property rights 
regimes for independent (‘disembedded’) firms with given exogenous institutions. The empirical 
findings here point to the working of market penetration and property rights in a different 
institutional environment which creates its institutions endogenously. Here, the different 
institutional arrangements that characterise embeddedness are the outcome of a contracting 
process with respect to local, ownership structure and mode of governance. Such a model is 
open to empirical testing. Moreover, it can also be assumed that the form of embeddedness 
shifts over time. With ongoing market penetration economic agents might find it advantageous to 
disembed a firm, for example by loosening the local ownership connection, while searching for 
ways to improve the embeddedness in partnership structures that safeguard access to new 
technologies or other form of input.  
 
On a conceptual level, theses findings suggest applying or recycling other approaches in which 
institution building and the spatial dimension of jurisdictions are endogenised. There is (1) 
contract theory where institutions are not regarded as the outcome of a competition driven 
process that forces economic agents to choose efficient institutions. Instead institutions are 
regarded as the result of bargaining or ‘contracting’ between parties (Libecap 2002). These 
approaches show that aggregate gains, let’s say from a complete property rights-regime, in 
terms of transaction cost reduction are not sufficient to ensure that such a institution will be 
established and enforced. For this to happen, the following other requirements need to be met. 
Small number of contracting parties, ex ante agreed upon sharing rules including compensation 
for the loosers of institutional change, and homogeneity of the parties with respect to institutional 
or property rights preferences. There is (2) constitutional economics which shows that 
decentralisation of legislation into small jurisdictions of agents with rather homogenous political 
preferences (ensuring anonymity in voting) leads to efficient outcomes (as deadweight losses 
can be avoided). Replacing political preferences with institutional preferences, such as the 
affinity to certain property rights regimes, custom, or business routines, would subsequently 
allow using the analytical tools as developed in constitutional economics (Buchanan and Tullock 
1962; Olson 1969; Blankart 1994). The preposition in this case were that designing jurisdictions 
where the contracting partners see their preferences for institutions converted into a 
corresponding supply at low cost will lead to more efficient outcomes (in terms of transaction 
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costs, compensation funds and deadweight losses). The Theory on Public Goods (and 
Commons) provides enough empirical evidence to make such a research agenda promising. As 
was shown by Ostrom (1990) communities small enough to ensure information impactedness 
and frequent contact facilitate institution building, particularly if the community also shares 
preferences for specific institutions, business routines, or in general certain social norms.  The 
empirical problem for applying these concepts for China, or any transition economy is then to 
show to which extent economic performance and institution building can be explained by size, 
interaction, compensation and preferences for business routines or property rights regimes. A 
further, and more intriguing question is then to inquire to which extent networks are the driving 
force behind the delineation of such efficient constituencies. 
 
Another result of the empirical study raises the question about organizational forms, 
organizational identity, and the transitory nature of organizational forms. Organizational 
economics which tries to explain the diversity of organizational forms and different mortality 
rates of different forms provides challenging insights when it is shown that intensity in 
competition for resources, age, the newness of firms are factors that explain the co-existence of 
different organizational forms of firms even if the general trends in market integration and market 
penetration are accounted for (Caroll and Hannan. 2000). To enlarge the analysis by first looking 
at all organization (intermediary institutions, and political organizations such as local state 
agencies), and allowing for other selection mechanism than market competition such as political 
protectionism, would once more point to the need to better conceptualize networks (Krug and 
Polos 2004). On one side, as the field study suggests, networks generate and sustain 
preferences for certain organizational configurations. On the other side networks hinder 
organizations to “close boundaries” (Nee 2000) thus perpetuating weak institutional institutions 
which must work to the detriment of efficiency and performance.  
 
All in all, with all the necessary caution the results suggest to include the following factors that 
might better explain different property rights regimes and different economic outcomes within 
China, as well as between different transition economies. 
 decentralisation (and jurisdictional competition) 
 local embeddedness of firms (as opposed to sectoral or factor market embeddedness) 
 delineation of constituencies that catch the spatial dimensions of preferences for 
institutions, property rights and business routines. 
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Table 1:  Sectoral distribution of Privately owned firms  
   [percentage of total number of privately owned firms in this sector] 
 
 
Province Zhejiang Jiangsu Shanxi Data set      
Sector/Year 2001 2001 2001 
n.a. 
1999-2003 
 Farming.Forestry.Animal 
Husbandry and Fishery  
1,01% 0,72%    
Manufacturing 60,14% 40,64%  60,49% 
 Construction  1,70% 2,08%    
 Transportation  1,14% 0,54%    
Wholesale, Retail Sale, Trade 
and Catering Service 
27,24% 48,91%  18,52% 
Social Service 7,50% 6,98%  20,99% 
 Repairing Trades  0,24% 0,14%    
 Others  1,02% _    
Source: Provincial Statistical Yearbook of Zhejiang and Jiangsu 1999-2002. 
 
 
Table 2: Classification of companies in the data set 
 
Industry Frequency Percent 
Semi-manufactured goods 18 22.2 
Wholesale, retail, marketing 11 13.6 
Household apparel 6 7.4 
IT: computer and telecom 7 8.6 
Textile 13 16.0 
Financial service: real estate, asset 
management 
7 8.6 
Tourism: Hotels 6 7.4 
Primary products 4 4.3 
Food processing 4 4.3 
Pharmaceutical 2 2.5 
(others) (2) (2.5) 
total 81  
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